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I. INTRODUCTION
The language of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
(section 337)' denounces "unfair methods of competition or unfair
acts" in the import trade. This language is on its face virtually
identical to the language of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act 2 (section 5) which proscribes "unfair methods of competi-
tion . . . and unfair . . . acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce." The relative identity of the statutory language could rea-
sonably lead one to believe that the results of adjudications of
charges of violation of the two acts should be similar. However, as
experience is beginning to show, this is not the case. The approaches
of the two agencies charged with the enforcement of the respective
statutes, the International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC), tend to be considerably different for
a number of reasons. Thus, the likelihood of consistency' in the
application of these virtually identical statutory provisions is not
great.
This article will examine two areas in which improved consistency
in application and interpretation of section 337 and section 5 is
desirable. The first includes the problems of overlapping jurisdic-
tion between the ITC under section 337 and the FTC under section
5. The second is the inherent discrimination against foreign compet-
itors resulting from section 337 and its implications for United
States competition policy. In this context, this article will not deal
comprehensively with the details of section 337 or section 5 and the
procedures employed for adjudications under each of them, both of
which have been commented upon by other authors recently.3
* The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
United States Federal Trade Commission or the United States Government generally.
** Assistant to the General Counsel for International Affairs, United States Federal Trade
Commission.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
See, e.g., La Rue, Section 337 of the 1930 Tarriff Act and Its Section 5 FTC Act
Counterpart, 43 ANTrrRUST L.J. 608 (1974); Brown, Unfair Methods of Competition in Impor-
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II. JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAPS BETWEEN THE FTC AND ITC
Due to the virtually identical language between section 5 and
section 337, the jurisdiction of the respective agencies under the
respective statutes clearly overlaps. Although it may be argued that
the ITC should have exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving
the import trade under section 337, nothing can be found in the
legislative history or case law under either section which indicates
any such limitations. Section 337, which came into existence after
section 5,1 was intended to shelter and protect United States indus-
tries,5 rather than to replace section 5.6 Section 5's applicability to
matters involving foreign commerce is well established.' However,
section 337 goes further than section 5 by creating what is essen-
tially a private right of action against "unfair methods of competi-
tion," which will be discussed below.
A. The Need to Avoid Duplication of Effort
Due to the substantially common language used in both statutes,
the jurisdiction of the ITC under section 337, other than in what are
essentially private controversies, is duplicative of a small area of the
larger jurisdiction of the FTC under section 5.1 Given this situation,
there is a need to avoid duplication of effort within the area of
overlap. The need arises in the interest of avoiding both unnecessary
expenditures of public funds and the possible unfairness of requiring
accused parties to answer to two agencies simultaneously with re-
tation: the Expanded Role of the U.S. International Trade Commission Under § 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as Amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 31 Bus. LAw. 1627 (1976).
1 The FTC Act was enacted in 1914, 38 Stat. 717, while section 337's predecessor, section
316, was created in the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 943.
* In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 465 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) provides that the ITC's proceedings and orders are to be "in addition
to any other provisions of law."
I See, e.g., Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944); Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 7 F.2d
994 (2d Cir. 1925); Sansui Electronics Corp., 86 F.T.C. 995 (1975).
1 The precise extent of the overlap is not clear. In Certain Electronic Audio and Related
Equipment, Investigation No. 337-TA-7 (I.T.C. filed July 10, 1973), I.T.C. Pub. No. 768
(April 1976), [hereinafter cited as Electronic Audio Equipment], the current Chairman of
the ITC, citing an earlier decision, Convertible Game Tables and Components Thereof,
Investigation No. 337-TA-34 (I.T.C., filed Oct. 26, 1972), Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 705 (Dec.
1974) [hereinafter cited as Convertible Game Tables], decided that no "nexus" between the
importation of a product into the United States and its involvement in the allegedly unfair
practice is required for jurisdiction under section 337 to attach. Under this construction,
virtually any unfair practice involving the sale of imported goods in the United States is
within the scope of section 337. Such broad construction was opposed by both the FTC and
the Department of Justice. See letters from FTC to ITC dated March 9, 1976, and from the
Department of Justice to ITC dated March 19, 1976.
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spect to the same alleged conduct. Section 337 provides a basis for
such avoidance by permitting actions initiated under it to be sus-
pended during the pendency of other proceedings involving the
same general subject matter. However, this provision is discretion-
ary with the ITC.' Although section 5 does not specifically author-
ize the FTC to defer to other agencies, the courts have recognized
that the FTC has broad discretion in choosing the cases it brings."
The situation between the FTC and the ITC with regard to their
jurisdictional overlaps may be compared to that between the FTC
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice with respect
to matters arising under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. It is clear,
for example, that conduct which violates the Sherman Act,'" which
is enforced by the Department of Justice, may also violate the FTC
Act, and that the two agencies have concurrent jurisdiction over the
various sections of the Clayton Act enforced by the FTC.' 3 The FTC
and the Department of Justice have for many years had a functional
liaison arrangement through which duplication of effort is generally
avoided.'" While it is clear that neither agency may prevent the
other from seeking to enforce the laws against the same parties with
respect to the same or similar conduct,' 5 it is generally accepted that
action by only one agency at a time is sufficient to protect the public
interest. "1
The need for such an arrangement between the ITC and the FTC
to avoid duplication of effort with respect to acts which could be
found to violate either section 5 or section 337 is apparent. Similar
need exists with the respect to the overlap between the ITC and the
Treasury Department in anti-dumping and countervailing duty
19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
0 For example, the ITC has used this provision recently in Certain Plastic Fastener Assem-
blies, Investigation No. 337-TA-36 (I.T.C., Notice of Suspension of Investigation Oct. 13,
1977). However, the ITC did not suspend proceedings, for example, in Certain Color Televi-
sion Receiving Sets, Investigation No. 337-TA-23 (I.T.C., filed Jan. 15, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Color TV Sets].
See, e.g., Moog Industries v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq. (1970).
' See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 683, 693 (1948); 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
" See, e.g., Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice
and the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAW. 2075 (1976). Revisions of that procedure
may now be in the making. See 834 ANTITRUST & TRADEREG. REP. (BNA) at A-8, 9 (1977).
, See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
, See FTC OPERATING MANUAL, 3.20B and app. D (1972), which provides that FTC
investigations may properly be closed inter alia if there are proceedings by another govern-
ment agency or private litigation with regard to the same conduct.
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cases. As the letter from the FTC to the ITC in connection with the
matter of Color TV Sets" demonstrates, however, such arrange-
ments have not been made. Unless the agencies are prepared to
enter into appropriate liaison arrangements or exercise great for-
bearance, it appears that the ITC is likely to duplicate under section
337 the activities of other agencies in the same general area, with a
consequentially increased burden for the taxpayers who must sup-
port both agencies.
Possible legislative solutions to the legislatively created jurisdic-
tional overlap might include either making the jurisdiction of one
agency in such areas exclusive, 8 that is, ousting the other agencies
from jurisdiction, or making avoidance of duplication of effort man-
datory by requiring each agency to defer to the agency which had
initiated a prior proceeding involving substantially the same con-
duct. However, neither of these possibilities appears to be realistic
at this time.
B. Need for Consistency in Interpretation of Identical Statutory
Language
Although the ITC has indicated that it is prepared to accept
certain fundamental judicial precedents in dealing with established
antitrust principles, it also has indicated that it does not feel bound
by the precedents of the FTC in interpreting what are or are not
unfair methods of competition or unfair acts or practices. 9 Perhaps
this is as it should be, since interpretation of such broad language
is properly committed to agency discretion and may change as be-
liefs and practices change over the years. As the Supreme Court
pointed out in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the FTC "does not
arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against
the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it,
like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust
laws. '2 0 However, assuming that the same broad discretion is avail-
7 Color TV Sets, supra note 10, Letter from FTC to ITC (Aug. 16, 1976).
* The differences of opinion concerning jurisdiction and the application of section 337
between the ITC and other agencies have apparently caught the eye of Congress. One cur-
rently pending bill, S. 1990, introduced Aug. 3, 1977, would inter alia, strip the ITC of its
jurisdiction over section 337 and transfer proceedings under the statute to a new cabinet
Department of International Trade and Investment in the interest of providing a coordinated
policy approach by the Government in this area. This approach, however, would still have
the overlap between section 5 and section 337.
" See Electronic Audio Equipment, note 8 supra.
- 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
[Vol. 8:65
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able to the ITC in interpreting section 337 as is available to the FTC
in cases under section 5, there is the anomaly of precedents in com-
petition and consumer protection issues being set by an agency
whose mandate is neither the protection of competition overall nor
protection of the consumer, but protection of domestic enterprises. 2'
In the interest of coordinated and consistent competition and con-
sumer protection policies, this situation is undesirable.
The reasons for concern are several. First, with respect to factual
determinations, the ITC, as opposed to the FTC, is obliged to deter-
mine whether there has been or is likely to be injury to a domestic
industry.22 It is required to make similar determinations in other
types of matters as well, such as in anti-dumping cases. 3 Its findings
of injury from time to time have apparently turned simply on ques-
tions of whether the domestic industry in question had been forced
to lower prices in order to avoid losing sales to foreign competitors, ' 4
without regard for such issues as whether the foreign competitors
were more efficient or possessed comparative advantages in labor or
raw material prices, or whether the prices established by the domes-
tic industry were inflated and noncompetitive in the first place.
Thus, while competition policy under the antitrust laws is con-
cerned with the health of the United States' economy overall and
the interest of the public in paying the lowest prices possible, 2 the
ITC is forced by section 337's language to place the interest of par-
ticular domestic competitors in the forefront of its decision making
process .
2
21 In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 465 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975). Although the section also denounces unfair acts
which "restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States" in the alternative
to finding injury to a domestic industry, the determination of injury is considered in practice
in every case. Complaints filed with the ITC, as one might expect, universally allege injury
to a domestic industry.
21 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. V 1975).
24 Articles Comprised of Plastic Sheets Having An Openwork Structure, Tariff Comm'n
Pub. No. 444, at 9 (1971). Note that the ITC was named the Tariff Commission, prior to the
enactment of the Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. 2231 (Supp. V 1975).
23 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958); Atlas Bldg. Prods.
Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
843 (1960).
" It appears that Congress may have intended to change the ITC's focus in this regard
when it amended section 337 in the Trade Act of 1974. See, SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE
REFORM AcT OF 1974, S. RE. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 193-200 reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7326-332. The Committee stated "that the public health and
welfare and the assurance of competitive conditions in the United States economy must be
the overriding considerations in the administration of this statute." Accordingly, the ITC was
to be required to consider the impact of any proposed orders, and to refuse to issue orders if
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In cases in which domestic industry appears to be losing out to
foreign competition, there is pressure for the ITC, considering the
policies which underlie section 337, to find some species of unfair-
ness on which to base remedial measures. Placing the welfare of
individual competitors above the maintenance of a competitive
market, however, tends to reduce the effectiveness of competition
and may encourage the continued use of noncompetitive or obsoles-
cent technology, organization, and distribution systems. Continued
operation of a noncompetitive domestic enterprise, in the long run,
will harm the public both through the higher prices it is forced to
pay and the delay of increased efficiency in the United States indus-
try which competition should promote. Section 337, however, tends
in practice to strike the balance in favor of domestic enterprises
rather than in favor of competition in the United States market.
Second, with respect to legal determinations of what constitutes
unfairness under section 337 and section, 5, the potential for inter-
pretation of virtually identical language in different ways by two
different and equally independent agencies causes substantial un-
certainty. Not only are the two agencies different in terms of overall
purpose and underlying policies, but they also differ markedly in
terms of the situations with which they deal on a regular basis. This
difference has resulted in differing expertise. The FTC has judicially
recognized expertise in making determinations of unfairness in both
competition and consumer protection matters based on its long ex-
perience in these fields.2 The ITC's experience is more specialized
and limited in the competition and consumer protection fields.
Handling of cases of unfair methods of competition (other than in
patent-based cases) has been a relatively minor part of the ITC's
overall activity, unlike the FTC's routine consideration of such mat-
ters. The ITC's involvement with consumer protection aspects of
commercial transactions has been even less substantial, whereas
such cases have constituted the majority of matters before the FTC
in recent years.3
Without frequent routine handling of matters in the competition
and consumer protection areas, it is understandable that the ITC
might be inclined to view matters differently from the FTC, even if
their overall effect on the public health and welfare or on competition would be negative,
"particularly . . . in cases where there is any evidence of price gouging or monopolistic
practices in the domestic industry." Id. at 197.
See, e.g., FrC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
" See 1976 F.T.C. ANN. REP., 14, 24 for a comparison of the actual caseload statistics of
the FTC in competition and consumer protection matters.
[Vol. 8:65
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the policy underpinnings of the two agencies were not as dissimilar
as they are. Particularly in instances in which relatively novel forms
of commercial behavior are involved, agencies which are not at-
tuned in the same way to the standards of the marketplace and the
expectations of the public are likely to have difficulty in arriving at
similar conclusions as to what conduct is unfair and which remedies
would be most appropriate.
Third, making determinations under sections 5 and 337 involves
application of both competition and consumer protection policy.
Both statutes are aimed broadly at preserving fairness in the market
place. However, once again we see different policy outlooks of the
FTC and ITC on these matters. The FTC is ultimately concerned
with protecting the public's interest in having access to the widest
variety of products and services through open and nondeceptive
competition in the market. 9 The ITC, consistent with its overall
purpose of protecting American industry not only through section
337 but also through the other laws it enforces, 0 is understandably
reluctant to recognize a competition policy which would allow
American enterprises to be injured or eliminated by more efficient
or better managed foreign competitors,3 even if American consum-
ers were likely to benefit from the competition.
Such a policy outlook on the part of the ITC does not square with
the policy of free and open competition espoused by the FTC, the
United States Department of Justice, and the antitrust laws in gen-
eral. In effect, such a policy can act to limit fair and efficient foreign
competition which frequently may be the best method of keeping
American industries competitive world-wide. If American markets
are preserved for American firms on a preferential basis, American
companies will have less incentive to develop the superior efficiency
of operation and aggressiveness of management which is essential
if they are to compete effectively in international trade.
Fourth, the potential for conflicting interpretations is com-
pounded by the fact that initial appellate review of decisions under
section 337 and section 5 is not in the same judicial channel. Deci-
" See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 64
F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 607 (1933).
19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
SI Although section 337 states that the injured industry must be "efficiently and economi-
cally operated," it does not set standards for measuring relative efficiency and economy of
operation or require that the domestic industry be as efficiently or economically operated as
its foreign competitors. The author is not aware of any section 337 antitrust case in which
inefficiency of the domestic industry has been found.
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sions of the FTC are reviewable in the United States Court of Ap-
peals, 2 whereas decisions of the International Trade Commission
are reviewed in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).33
The CCPA handles matters involving unfair methods of competi-
tion even less frequently than the ITC. Although certiorari from
appellate decisions in both systems may be sought in the Supreme
Court,3 in practice it has been rare for the Supreme Court to hear
cases from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Given this
situation, the likelihood of consistency in application through the
judicial review process is not great.
III. SECTION 337-A DISCRIMINATORY METHOD OF PROVIDING A
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST "UNFAIR METHODS OF
COMPETITION"?
Considering the policy purposes of section 337 over the years as
described above, it is not surprising that the statute is discrimina-
tory in that it can be invoked only against foreign producers and
importers. In contrast, section 5 is applicable to all persons, partner-
ships or corporations in or affecting United States commerce, with-
out regard to nationality. The discrimination inherent in section 337
compared to section 5 is manifested in three ways: (1) in its scope
of application; (2) in terms of the remedies available against viola-
tors; and (3) in substantive interpretation.
A. Discrimination in Scope of Application
It is well settled that no private right of action exists under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 The policy reasons for this
situation are relatively simple. The language of section 5 condemn-
ing "unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" is extremely broad. A criminal statute of such breadth
would arguably be "void for vagueness." 3 However, the FTC Act is
made precise in practice through the rulings of its enforcing agency.
u 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)-(e) (1970).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. V 1975).
" See discussion in La Rue, note 3 supra, at 612, concerning the doubtfulness of the
availability of certiorari in section 337 cases.
" See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485. F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Guern-
sey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, ANITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 751, D-1 (1976),
in which a private right of action against a party allegedly in violation of an FTC order was
recognized.
N, But see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa.
1975), upholding the constitutionality of the treble damages provisions of the Antidumping
Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (1970), against a "void for vagueness" challenge.
[Vol. 8:65
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The operative provisions of section 5 provide for administrative pro-
ceedings in the first instance. Rulings of the FTC under it are pro-
spective in operation. The decision to initiate proceedings under
section 5 is made by the FTC as a whole, and the Commission is
required to act only in the public interest, rather than to redress
private wrongs or become involved in private controversies. 7 The
FTC does not have criminal jurisdiction, nor does it have authority
to impose civil penalties for violations of the Act without proceeding
through the courts. Civil penalties may only be imposed upon per-
sons who have either violated orders of the Commission prohibiting
continuation of specific activities or trade regulation rules which
also prohibit specific activities. 8 Further, since section 5 can only
be invoked by the Commission in the first instance rather than by
private parties, problems of inconsistent application as between dif-
ferent industries or parties are largely forestalled.3
By contrast, section 337 provides that upon receipt of verified
complaints in proper form, the ITC "shall" initiate investigations
into conduct which arguably violates the terms of the statute. 0
Since the statute is applicable only against foreign producers or
importers, however, there is an immediate discrimination. Persons
who are being victimized by identical acts on the part of domestic
producers or resellers are left without a private right to commence
an administrative proceeding. There also is no private judicial rem-
edy unless the allegedly unfair acts of domestic parties come within
the ambit of the antitrust laws as defined in the Clayton Act."
Secondly, under the ITC's procedures, the complainant's attorney
in effect acts as prosecutor," rather than a government attorney as
in FTC proceedings. 3
Thus, accusations of "unfair methods of competition or unfair
acts" resulting in injury to private parties may be lodged under
31 FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) and (m) (1970).
' See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973), for a discussion of
the reasons why enforcement by the FTC is preferred.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The mandatory language of the statute gives the
ITC little discretion to refuse to accept technically well-drawn complaints.
15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 15, 26 (1970).
' See 16 C.F.R. § 3.1, et seq. (1977) for the procedures applicable to FTC adjudications
under section 5.
13 See 19 C.F.R. § 210 (1977), which provides procedural rules for proceedings under section
337, including rights of complainants. As one might expect, attorneys representing private
parties are not as likely as government attorneys to recognize possible public interests which
may be found on the side of a respondent.
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section 337 without having to meet the "public interest" criteria
required for proceeding under section 5. Foreign producers or im-
porters may thus be forced to defend themselves against charges
which could not be leveled against domestic competitors alleged to
have engaged in identical conduct. Being subjected to such proceed-
ings and the possible penalties if violations are found tends to
weaken the competitiveness of foreign producers and importers vis-
a-vis their domestic competitors.
Further, while no one should presume that domestic competitors
would act in bad faith in filing complaints under section 337, the
potential for anticompetitive use of that section against manufac-
turers and importers of foreign products is substantial. 4 With lower
burdens of proof and less restrictive rules of evidence than normally
would be required in private actions under the antitrust laws,
4 5
American businessmen who desire to restrict or eliminate competi-
tion from abroad may seize upon virtually any type of activity which
might be deemed unfair, ranging from classic cases of patent in-
fringement or price fixing to such de minimis acts as misleading
representations at the point of sale by employees of a seller who is
in some way affiliated with an importer. Acts normally considered
to be "unfair" only to consumers have been included in proceedings
under section 337.45
B. Discrimination in Remedies Available
Section 337 authorizes the ITC to issue orders excluding goods
involved in violations from the United States market . 7 The ITC has
previously recommended the use of such an order in one antitrust
case under section 337.45 No comparable authority exists under sec-
tion 5 or the other antitrust laws.49 Thus if foreign producers or
" See La Rue, note 3 supra. If it were possible to demonstrate that complaints against
importers or foreign producers were filed in bad faith with an anticompetitive purpose, a
private action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), could be brought
against the complainants. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972).
11 Under section 337, injury to competition overall need not be shown. Further it is clear
that the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings do not apply in administrative hearings, see,
e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. at 705-06. The ITC's rules on evidence are typically
broad, providing that, "[rielevant, material and reliable evidence shall be admitted." 19
C.F.R. § 210.42 (1977).
" See, Convertible Game Tables, note 8 supra.
' 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (Supp. V 1975).
Tractor Parts, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 443 (Dec. 1971) (this decision reversed the earlier
one). Tractor Parts, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 401, (June 1971) (this original decision recom-
mended an embargo on Berco parts).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) and 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970) and the "antitrust laws" defined
[Vol. 8:65
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importers are found to have engaged in "unfair" conduct, they face
remedial orders which are potentially more crippling than the dam-
ages which injured parties might recover in a civil damage suit or
the provisions of a "cease and desist" order issued by the FTC.
While such exclusion orders may be appropriate to defend lawful
monopolies in patent-based cases, their anticompetitive effect is
obvious. If one accepts the concept that competition is the best
means of allocating resources and encouraging efficiency, it makes
no sense to use remedial measures which will totally prevent compe-
tition in the future. ° Rather, orders should be framed with a view
towards encouraging fair competition in the public interest. Exclu-
sion orders should therefore be used only in cases involving patents,
and should be applied sparingly even in those cases, if other appro-
priate means are sufficient to protect the legitimate interests of the
patent holder.
Due at least in part to the severity of the remedies available if ITC
proceedings are allowed to run their course, avoiding anticompeti-
tive settlements between complainants and the parties accused of
unfair conduct under section 337 is another cause for concern. The
temptation for foreign manufacturers or importers to enter into un-
duly restrictive settlements to avoid exclusion orders and reduce the
burdens of litigation is considerable. It could result in settlements
which would diminish the competitive vigor of importers in United
States commerce generally. In recent years imports have provided
the basis for much of the competition in several major American
industries. It would be unfortunate if the American public were to
be deprived of this source of competition and incentive for greater
efficiency in American business.
For example, if the alleged unfairness consists of sales by an im-
porter at unreasonably low prices, a settlement whereby the im-
porter in effect agrees with the complainant to raise his prices may
be satisfactory between the parties in eliminating the alleged
"unfair" practice. Such a settlement, however, raises obvious diffi-
therein. A comparable order in the domestic context, for example, might consist of prohibit-
ing the sale of products in a manner similar to that used by the Consumer Products Safety
Commission for products found to be physically dangerous. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2057-2058 (Supp. V
1975). Imported products which are judged to be physically dangerous under the same stan-
dards as domestic products may also be excluded from the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 2066
(Supp. V 1975).
1 Even the ITC staff has apparently accepted the view that exclusion orders are inappro-
priate in antitrust proceedings under section 337. See Certain Angolan Robusta Coffee, Inves-
tigation No. 337-TA-16 (I.T.C., filed Nov. 26, 1974), Brief of Commission Investigative Staff
Concerning Disposition of Investigation at 3 n.1.
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culties under the Sherman Act 5 and FTC Act." Thus it is conceiva-
ble that a settlement of a section 337 proceeding, once all its ramifi-
cations are known, might itself become the subject of antitrust ac-
tion under other statutes. 3
C. Discrimination in Substantive Interpretation
This situation would arise to the extent that section 337 may be
interpreted by the ITC as reaching types of "unfair" conduct which
are not condemned by the FTC under section 5. So far this discrimi-
nation remains a threat rather than a reality. In Electronic Audio
Equipment,4 the current Chairman of the ITC, while acting as Pres-
iding Officer, announced his view that section 337 could reach un-
fair conduct not covered by other similar statutes." In that proceed-
ing, however, there was no occasion to test this proposition since no
violation was found.
Should the ITC in future cases go beyond the expansive area
already carved out by the FTC under section 5, the import may be
substantial. At present one may only speculate how far such inter-
pretations of unfairness might go. The existence of this uncertainty,
however, is at least another factor which might induce persons ac-
cused of violation of section 337 to settle the proceedings.
IV. POSSIBLE WAYS TO ELIMINATE SECTION 337's INHERENT
DISCRIMINATION
There are a number of ways in which the present discriminatory
situation could be remedied. One would be to do away with section
337 altogether, leaving actions against unfair methods of competi-
tion to the FTC under section 5 and actions against infringements
of patents to the courts. This alternative would probably be unac-
ceptable to those interests which secured passage of section 337
originally and continue to utilize it today. In this era of increasing
resort to litigation, it is difficult to conceive that a right of action
once granted would be taken away. Further, if one accepts the goal
15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1970).
Although the ITC must consider motions for termination by reason of settlements, 19
C.F.R. § 210.51-55 (1977), its record of recognizing anticompetitive activities which tend to
favor domestic parties is not encouraging. See Furazolidone, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 299
(1969).
' See note 8 supra. #6
Id. Convertible Game Tables Investigation, supra note 8 at 36, Recommended Decision
of Commissioner Minchew.
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that unfair methods of competition and unfair practices generally
should be eliminated from the market place, actions initiated by
injured parties provide a much greater likelihood of enforcement
than would be the case if one were forced to rely on the limited
resources of the law enforcement agencies.
Another possibility would be to require that the ITC not initiate
investigations under section 337 except in matters where the public
interest, as opposed to the private interests of complainants, is
clearly involved." This would equalize the legal tests for initiation
of proceedings under section 5 and section 337. It should also fore-
stall the filing of de minimis cases under section 337.17 It would not,
however, resolve the problems of inconsistent interpretation of
identical statutory language described earlier in this article.
Another possible method of remedying the discrimination, con-
sidering the unlikelihood of being able to cut back on rights of action
already in existence, would be to create private rights of action
under section 5 of the FTC Act similar to those existing under sec-
tion 337,18 that is, required initiation of investigations upon receipt
of sworn complaints under section 5 of the FTC Act in order to
permit private actions against alleged perpetrators of unfair meth-
ods of competition. To do so, however, would require substantial
expansion of the FTC in order simply to hear such complaints and
rule upon them, even if private attorneys were permitted to act as
prosecutors. To require that complaints be prosecuted only by
agency staff members would be very costly in terms of FTC man-
power and would doubtless be less than satisfactory to complain-
ants. The impact on business of creating such private rights of ac-
tion, while it would be difficult to estimate, would also be substan-
tial. If the remedies were expanded to include damages59 as well as
FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
See Crocheted Bootie Sets from Korea, filed May 30, 1975, amended complaint filed July
14, 1975. This case was not accepted for docketing by the ITC. It involved, inter alia, allega-
tions that the accused importer failed to pay minimum wages to employees who packed the
imported bootie sets for distribution and resale.
See § 7(a) of the 1977 Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, H.R. 3816,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Amendment proposed that private persons be granted rights
of action in the courts to recover damages for violations of trade regulation rules or final cease
and desist orders issued by the FTC. Such rights, however, would not have included authori-
zation to initiate proceedings before the FTC with respect to violations of the FTC Act itself.
This section was dropped prior to House and Senate approval of the bill. TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) Report No. 304, pt. I, at 8 (Oct. 24, 1977).
51 Payment of restitution to victims of unfair conduct is not among the remedies which the
FTC may order. See, Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974). However, actions by the
FTC in the courts to obtain such restitution are authorized. 15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp. V 1975).
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cease and desist orders, it could be devastating.
Another alternative would be to provide for private actions on the
basis of sworn complaints of unfair methods of competition to be
heard by the courts. To do so, however, would inevitably erode
consistency in the application of the broad statutory language be-
cause of the large number of courts which would hear cases, particu-
larly if state courts as well as the federal courts were involved.
Further, the desirability of adding to the existing case loads of the
courts in such a way is questionable.
V. CONCLUSION
The overlapping jurisdiction between the FTC and ITC under
sections 5 and 337, respectively, is unfortunate. The overlap was
nevertheless deliberately created by the Congress and can only be
changed by legislative action. The potential for unnecessary dupli-
cation of effort between the two agencies could be substantially
reduced if the agencies would enter into appropriate liaison arrange-
ments. However, the possibility of inconsistent determinations of
law and applications of policy will remain inherent as a result of the
independence of both agencies if the statutes are not changed.
A further anomaly is that section 337 as it currently exists creates
a substantial discrimination against foreign manufacturers or im-
porters of foreign goods by permitting what amount to private ac-
tions against such parties. No such right exists under section 5 with
respect to identical conduct by domestic parties, and Congress has
persistently refused to create one.6"
The need for such discrimination under United States law is not
clear, and its continued existence invites trade retaliation by foreign
governments who may perceive their interests as being unfairly
treated by the United States. To the extent that there is a need to
offer a means of redress to persons victimized by unfair methods of
competition or unfair practices, it should be available regardless of
whether the perpetrators of such acts or practices are foreign or
domestic. If the injury inflicted is substantially the same, the justifi-
cation for limiting private rights of action to suits brought against
foreign interests or importers, as opposed to domestic persons who
may engage in similar harmful or predatory practices, is spurious.
Given the desirability of curtailing unfair methods of competition
in general and the unlikelihood of curtailing private rights of action
such as those created under section 337 as it currently exists, it
See note 58 supra.
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appears that the best method for eliminating both the overlap be-
tween the FTC and ITC in this area and the discriminatory nature
of section 337 would be creation of more universal private rights to
pursue unfair methods of competition without regard to their ori-
gins, displacing the ITC in non-patent cases of unfairness and sup-
plementing the FTC's public interest proceedings. Remedies, as in
the case of section 5, should be along the lines of cease and desist
orders. The place to pursue such remedies should not, however, be
in the courts, which might have difficulty in applying consistent
interpretations of the broad mandate necessary to halt unfair meth-
ods of competition. Instead, such actions should be brought before
a specialized administrative tribunal"' whose decisions could be
subject to judicial review in the same manner as are those of the
FTC under present legislation. The question of whether damages
should be available for private parties injured by unfair commercial
conduct not amounting to a violation of the antitrust laws as defined
in the Clayton Act"2 is one which will require particularly close
study. Damage awards would probably require judicial action. 3
Such a new system would require a major legislative effort which
is not likely to take place soon. Nevertheless, the author hopes that
Congress will be able in the long run to discern the wisdom of treat-
ing similar unfair methods of competition, acts, and practices even-
handedly, without regard to the nationality of the parties alleged to
have engaged in them.
" A single tribunal, somewhat like the FrC or the National Labor Relations Board, could
hear cases in the first instance using administrative law judges to conduct hearings in locales
where the cases could be most conveniently heard, rather than requiring all complainants,
respondents and witnesses to come to a single location. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.41 (1977).
2 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
1 It does not appear that there is any bar to having an administrative agency determina-
tion impose appropriate penalties in the first instance, so long as the standards of due process
are met. Atlas Roofing Co. Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990
(5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 1261 (1977). However, such administrative awards of damages
are not within the scope of the Constitution under present interpretations. As shown by recent
legislative action, supra note 58, the concept of private rights of action to recover damages
for violation of section 5 is not yet acceptable to the Congress, although bringing consumer
redress actions in the courts by the FTC itself is authorized under section 19 of the FTC Act.
15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp. V 1975).
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